ABSTRACT The broadcast nature of air-to-ground line-of-sight (LoS) wireless channel imposes a great challenge in secure unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communications. To address this issue, this paper investigates UAV-ground communications from the physical-layer security perspective. Specifically, the investigated scenario includes a UAV serving as the base station (BS) that transmits confidential signals to a legitimate ground user, and there are multiple eavesdroppers on the ground with unknown position information. To further enhance the secrecy performance of the UAV-ground communications, an idle UAV can be employed to serve as a friendly jammer, which can transmit jamming signals to confuse the eavesdroppers. In our proposed strategy, the flying trajectory and the transmit power for both the UAVs are jointly optimized by maximizing the worst-case secrecy rate (WCSR) of the system. Considering the intractability of the formulated non-convex problem, we further provide a block coordinate descent-based iterative optimization method. Simulations verify that our proposed algorithm can significantly improve the average WCSR in comparison with the existing works.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the low cost and high flexibility, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have gained increasing interests in the areas of emergency services, intelligent transportation, etc. Recently, UAVs have also been applied in wireless communications [1] - [3] . As the UAV-to-ground channels usually exhibit line-of-sight (LoS) links, UAV is regarded as an attractive candidate wireless service provider [4] . Hence, some information technology giants, such as Facebook [5] and Google [6] , have launched pilot projects for providing
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Anandakumar Haldorai. ubiquitous access by using UAVs. Meanwhile, great efforts in academia have also been devoted to exploit various applications of UAVs [7] like the aerial base stations [8] - [10] , the flying computing cloudlets [11] , the mobile relays [12] , the solar-powered UAV communication platform [13] , and so on. However, the broadcast nature of wireless communications imposes great threat on the information secrecy for UAV. Besides, the UAV-to-ground channel usually exhibits an LoS link, which makes UAV communications more susceptible for interceptions by ground eavesdroppers. These impose a severe security challenge on UAV communications.
To address the secrecy issue in UAV communications, extensive information secrecy related techniques have been VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ proposed at different protocol layers. For example, cryptographic methods are deployed at the higher protocol layer usually with high computational complexity. As a more computationally efficient and resource-saving alternative [14] , physical layer security (PLS) techniques [15] - [18] utilize the characteristics of wireless channels and the quality gap between the legitimate and wiretap channels to guarantee perfect information-theoretic secrecy. Therefore, PLS emerges as a promising concept in wireless communication systems. Recently, several works have focused on how to guarantee a secure UAV communication by PLS-enhanced techniques [19] , [20] . For example, UAV-enabled relaying technique was introduced to enhance the secrecy capacity of wireless communication systems [21] , [22] . Besides, UAV could also serve as a friendly jammer to improve the secrecy performance [23] - [25] . In [26] , a joint UAV trajectory and power allocation design strategy was studied, where the secrecy rate was maximized by enhancing the legitimate link and deteriorating the wiretap link. To strengthen the practicability of the scenario, a robust joint UAV trajectory and power allocation strategy was developed in [27] , where more than one eavesdroppers exist on the ground with their exact locations unknown. However, since there are multiple eavesdroppers and their exact locations are unknown, it is difficult for the UAV to serve as source (termed as source UAV hereafter) keep far from all the eavesdroppers (Eves). Thus, it is very likely that the UAV-to-destination channel is worse than the UAV-to-eavesdropper channel during most of its flight. In such a scenario, the UAV-to-destination link cannot exchange any confidential information since the secrecy capacity is zero.
Motivated by the fact that once the main channel is noisier than the wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity will be zero, we employ an idle UAV which serves as a cooperative jammer to enhance the secrecy capacity of the UAV communications. To be specific, UAV serving as the cooperative jammer (termed as jammer UAV hereafter) can schedule its flying trajectory as close as possible to the ground eavesdroppers, and then transmits jamming signals to the eavesdroppers to compromise the wiretap channel [15] , [16] , [28] , [29] . With the help of the jammer, it can be guaranteed that, during most of the flight, the UAV-to-destination link has a greater chance to be better than the UAV-to-eavesdropper link. Hence, in such a scenario, and with inexact eavesdropper location information, it is a meaningful and challenging issue to jointly optimize the trajectory and transmit power of both UAVs. To the best of our knowledge, this issue has yet not been addressed.
In this paper, we investigate the PLS issue in UAV communications with multiple location-unknown eavesdroppers. In the investigated scenario, a source UAV transmits confidential signals to a ground destination, where multiple on-ground eavesdroppers are present, with their specific locations unknown to the source UAV. Meanwhile, an idle UAV is employed to serve as a friendly jammer and transmit jamming signals to suppress the wiretap channel. Then, we propose to jointly optimize the transmit power and flying trajectories for both UAVs (i.e., source UAV and jammer UAV), in order to maximize the average worst-case secrecy rate (WCSR). The main contributions of our work are as follows:
• In this paper, we employ an idle UAV as a cooperative jammer who transmits jamming signals to confuse the eavesdroppers. Besides, this work also takes into account multiple eavesdroppers with inexact location information, which is more reasonable for practical applications. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers such a scenario.
• In our strategy, the flying trajectories and the transmit power for both UAVs are jointly optimized by maximizing the system WCSR. Considering the formulated optimization problem is an NP-hard one, we propose a block coordinate descent and successive convex optimization method, which optimizes the power of UAVs, the trajectory of source UAV, and the trajectory of jammer UAV in an iterative manner.
• Our proposed strategy possesses strong robustness against the uncertainty of the multiple eavesdroppers, which is verified by conducted simulations. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model and the problem formulation are described. In Section III, the problem solution to our formulated non-convex problem is described. Simulations are presented to verify the efficiency in enhancing the system secrecy of our proposed strategy in Section IV. Followed by the conclusions in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a UAV-ground wireless communication system. A source UAV (S) above the ground transmits confidential information to a legitimate ground destination (D), with K ground Eves (E) trying to wiretap the legitimate communication from S to D. In this paper, a jammer UAV (J) is employed to transmit jamming signals to confuse the Eves. Thanks to the mobility of UAVs, the source UAV is inclined to move close to the destination to enhance the legitimate channel and achieve higher transmit rate, while the jammer UAV tends to hover above the Eves to obtain better jamming performance. In the study, we assume that each node has a single antenna. The scenario is shown in Fig. 1 .
Without loss of generality, we assume that D locates at (0, 0, 0), which is exactly known by S. In practice, the rough location information of Eves can be estimated by an camera or synthetic aperture radar [27] , [30] . While the Eves may try to hide their existences, and thus the location estimation may suffer from errors. Therefore, we express the relationship between the real and the estimated location of Eve k in the x-y coordinate as follows
where
is the exact location of Eve k, x k and y k are the estimation errors for x k and y k respectively, i.e.,
(2) And ε k represents the possible error set. Then, we can regard that Eve k locates in a circular region with center (x E k , y E k , 0) and radius Q k .
It is assumed that UAVs fly at a constant altitude H , which is specified for the safety consideration such as building avoidance [26] . In practice, the constant altitude can help reduce the energy consumption in ascending or descending. Besides, the derived results in this paper can be easily extended to the case with the altitude considered. Thus, S's coordinate over time is expressed as (x S (t), y S (t), H ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where T is its flight duration. To simplify the trajectory design, we quantize the flight duration T into N small time slots with equal length d t . Since d t is small enough, S can be regarded as static in each time slot. Thus, S's coordinate over the duration T can be expressed as a sequence 
∀n. (4) The UAV-ground channels are mainly LoS links demonstrated in [26] , [27] . As a result, we assume that the channel power gain mainly depends on the distance between transmitter UAV and the ground receiver. Thus, the channel gain between the UAV p ∈ {S, J } and ground receiver q ∈ {D, E} at slot n follows the free-space path loss model as follows,
where β 0 is the power gain within reference distance d 0 = 1, and d pq is the distance between the UAV p and the ground node q at time n.
As we primarily concern about the system secrecy rate of the system and assume that the energy of the UAV is sufficient within the mission period. Therefore, we focus on the information transmit power of the UAV. Assume P p [n] is the transmit power in time slot n, P pmax is the allowable peak transmit power of UAV p. Then, the power constraints of UAVs are
To guarantee a secure transmission under indeterministic eavesdropper channel state information (CSI), we adopt the WCSR as the performance matric. Concretely, the WCSR is defined as the minimum secrecy rate for any error of the uncertainty region,
where [x] + max(x, 0), σ 2 denotes Gaussian noise power. Then, log 2 R D [n] and log 2 R E k [n] represent the achievable rate of D and Eve k at time slot n, respectively.
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
For the secrecy communication from S to D, we jointly optimize the trajectory and transmit power for both source UAV and jammer UAV to maximize the average WCSR subject to their mobility and power constraints. The optimization variables include the flying trajectory and transmit power of both UAVs, which are
where † is the transpose operation. Then, the WCSR can be formulated as follows, where constant term 1/N is omitted, (4), (6a), (6b), VOLUME 7, 2019 (P0) is difficult to solve due to the following reasons: 1) the operator [·] + is non-smoothness for the objective function; 2) the objective function is not concave even without the [·] + operation; 3) the infinite number of possible (x k , y k ) make (P0) an intractable optimization problem. Thus, in the following section, we propose an efficient iterative algorithm to solve (P0) approximately.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR (P0)
Through setting P S [n] = 0, we can guarantee each item in the summation be non-negative. Thus, we can omit the operation [·] + , and the formula of (P0) can be derived as follows,
Although (P1) is more tractable, it is still a non-convex optimization problem. Fortunately, we observe it can be divided into two components, i.e., the trajectory and transmit power, which facilitates the problem optimization via the block coordinate descent method [31] . To be specific, we solve (P1) by solving the following three sub-problems iteratively:
• Optimize S's trajectory (x S , y S ) under given P S , P J and (x J , y J );
• Optimizie J's trajectory (x J , y J ) knowing P S , P J and (x S , y S );
• Jointly optimize the two UAVs' power P S and P J under certain UAVs' trajectories. Then, the sub-optimization procedure experiences an iterative manner until the algorithm converges.
A. OPTIMIZING SOURCE UAV'S TRAJECTORY (x S , y S )
Knowing the P S , P J and J's trajectory, (P1) can be expressed as (P2) : max 
, the optimization problem of S's trajectory can be derived as
(3).
(P2) and (P3) are equivalent in terms of (x S , y S ), as the constraints (11b) and (11c) must hold with equalities at the optimal solution to (P3). Since if constraints (11b) and (11c) are not tight, the objective value of (11a) can be improved by increasing t[n] or decreasing u [n] . Therefore, we can solve (P3) instead. However, (P3) is still difficult to solve, because of the infinite number of ( x k , y k ) in constraint (11b). Now, we substitute (1) and (2) into (11b) as follows
According to S-procedure [27] , which gives conditions under which a particular quadratic inequality is a consequence of another quadratic inequality, the implication (12a)⇒(12b) holds if and only if there is
Then, the optimization problem can be rewritten as follows, 
(P4) is reformulated as follows,
After the above approximation, (19a) is concave and the constraints are convex. As a result, the (P5) is a semi-definite programming which can be simply solved with the interiorpoint method [31] .
Given the P S , P J and S's trajectory, (P1) can be expressed as
After introducing l 
,
To solve (P6), firstly we simplify the constraint of (21c). We solve the eavesdropper k's location to maximize
Assuming jammer's trajectory in the (l − 1)th iteration is (
, we use the J' location in the (l − 1)th iteration to approximately achieve the maximization of
Then, based on the geometrical theory, the location of Eve k can be obtained by maximizing h k at the lth iteration, as follows
Therefore, constraint (21c) can be further rewritten as
Besides, the objective function (21a) is non-concave. Hence, we approximate the term log 2 1 + with its upper bound as follows,
where, m (l−1) is the solution of m in the (l − 1)th iteration, and
. VOLUME 7, 2019 Moreover, the terms x 2 J [n] and y 2 J [n] are non-linear, leading to the non-concavity of constraint (21b). Based on (26), (28) . (29) It is worth noting that (P7) is a convex optimization problem, which can be solved efficiently by convex optimization such as CVX [31] .
C. JOINTLY OPTIMIZING BOTH UAVs' TRANSMIT POWER P S AND P J
Knowing the trajectories of both UAVs, (P1) can be rewritten as (P8) : max
First, we optimize ( x k , y k ) to obtain the maximization of log 2 R E k [n] as follows,
As the value of P J [n]h JE k [n] is much greater than the noise power on the receiver side, we can approximately optimize the function as follows, 
where 
Similarly, we can also obtain h SD [n] and h JD [n] . Then, we can obtain max k∈K f k among the k eavesdroppers.
Assuming k = k * , log 2 (1 + 
Constraints (36b) and (36c) constitute a closed plane, thus the continuous objective function can achieve its maximum value either on the boundary or Fermat point. Via simple mathematical manipulation, we can obtain the Fermat point of (36a) as follows,
. On the other side, we can obtain the optimal values among boundary points by simple mathematical manipulation. Hence, we can obtain the maximum of (36a) among the Fermat point and the boundary optimal point. Finally, the optimal solution is achieved denoted as (P Sopt [n], P Jopt [n]). (24) and (25); Then, solve (P7) under given P
Solve the inner Fermat point P S , P J with (37) and (38); Obtain the optimal value among boundary points; Select the point, who makes (36a) reach its maximum value, among the Fermat point and the boundary optimal point. 7 : until The increase of the objective value is smaller than a threshold ε.
In summary, the entire solution to (P1) is obtained by iteratively and alternately employing block coordinate descent and successive convex approximation method, i.e. optimizing S's trajectory, optimizing J's trajectory, and jointly optimizing both UAVs' transmit power alternately and iteratively. The complexity of the proposed algorithm is
where L is the number of iterations. Details of the proposed solution to (P1) are shown in Algorithm 1.
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we carry out simulations to evaluate the performance of our proposed joint trajectory and transmit power design for both source and jammer UAVs with inexact eavesdropper location information, which we call as ''partial CSI with jamming (P-CSI/&J)'' scheme hereafter. We compare the proposed algorithm with the following two benchmark schemes: 1) joint trajectory and transmit power design without jammer, which we call as ''partial CSI without jamming (P-CSI/NJ)'' scheme hereafter. There is no jammer UAV in this scheme, the other configuration is the same as our proposed algorithm. 2) joint trajectory and transmit power design for both source and jammer UAVs with exact eavesdropper location information, that is the same problem as our proposed algorithm except for knowing exact eavesdropper location information. We call it ''exact CSI with jamming (E-CSI/&J)'' scheme hereafter. The E-CSI/&J scheme will give us a reference of the gap between our proposed solution and the ideal solution. In the simulation, we set the number of eavesdroppers to 2. The initial feasible points are designed as follows: the source UAV flies to the point above destination at the maximum speed, then hovers there, and finally flies at the maximum speed to reach its final location; the jammer UAV flies to the point above the geometric center of the eavesdroppers at the maximum speed, then hovers at that point, and finally flies at the maximum speed to reach its final location. If UAVs do not have sufficient time to reach their hovering points, they will turn midway and fly to the final locations at the maximum speed 
A. TRAJECTORIES OF UAVs FOR THE THREE ALGORITHMS
For case 1, Fig. 2 shows the trajectories of both UAVs for different schemes in different period T . The D and Eves are marked with • and ×, respectively. The gray dotted circles represent the eavesdropper uncertain region. It is observed that when T = 40 s, the UAVs in different algorithms will obtain very similar trajectories, as T = 40 s is the minimum time for UAV flying from the initial location to the final location at the maximum speed. Then, we will analyze the situation when sufficient time is given, i.e. T = 120 s. We can split the flying into three stages. In the first stage, for all the three algorithms, the source UAVs fly in an arc path to a certain point near the destination at their maximum speed. In the second stage, they hover at this point as long as possible. The hovering point strikes an optimal balance between the information transmission and avoiding being eavesdropped by the Eves. Finally, in the third stage, they fly towards the final location in an arc path and reach there at the last time. For the E-CSI/&J and P-CSI/&J schemes, the jammer UAVs fly towards a certain point near the eavesdroppers and keep away from the destination in the first stage. Then, they hover at this point as long as possible, in the second stage. The hovering point strikes an optimal balance between the jamming service and not causing strong inference to the destination. Finally, they fly towards the final location and reach there at the last time. For both E-CSI/&J and P-CSI/&J schemes, in the first two stages, with the help of jammer, the trajectories of the source UAVs are more closed to the destination in comparison with P-CSI/NJ scheme. A smaller distance between the destination and the source UAV benefits the information confidential transmission between them. Besides, a shorter flying arc path in the first stage enables that the source UAV has more time to hover in the second stage, which also benefits the improvement of the achievable secrecy rate. The estimated circle centers of the Eves are symmetrical with respect to the x-axis, and Q 2 is bigger than Q 1 . So all the stable points of source UAVs are above the x-axis to avoid wiretapping, and the stable point of the UAV friendly jammers are below the x-axis to suppress the Eves' channel more effectively.
For case 2, Fig. 3 not sufficient for UAVs to fly to the stable point, i.e. T = 45 s, both source UAV and jammer UAV fly in a compromise arc path to the final location non-stop. When given sufficient time, i.e. T = 120 s, the stable point will appear for both source UAV and jammer UAV. In the first stage, in both E-CSI/&J and P-CSI/&J schemes, the trajectories of source UAVs are more closed to the destination in comparison with the P-CSI/NJ scheme. A closer trajectory to the destination can obtain a better legitimate channel and achieve a higher rate for the destination. While, in the third stage, the opposite situation occurs. It is because that P-CSI/NJ turns off its power (P S = 0) most of the third stage. Note that once the distance of J-to-E is greater than that of J-to-D, the jamming signal will compromise the main channel more. Therefore, the jammer UAV keeps silent during the first few time slots. With the decrease of the J-to-E, the jammer UAV gradually increases its transmit power. The jammer UAV transmits jamming signals with the full power at the hovering point near the eavesdroppers. When the jammer UAV flies towards its final location, it turns off its transmit power gradually. With the help of jammer, our proposed P-CSI/&J scheme can enhance the average secrecy rate of the system in a large degree in comparison with P-CSI/NJ scheme. In the next section, we will verify the secrecy rate performance on the quantitative aspect.
B. SECRECY RATE PERFORMANCE FOR THE THREE SCHEMES
In this section, we verify the secrecy rate performances for the three schemes. The configuration is the same as case 2 except for a variational flying period T and a UAV maximum output power P max in this section. Fig. 4 demonstrates the average secrecy rate versus the different flight duration T for different schemes. In the figure, it can be observed that the secrecy rates of all schemes increase with T . There is a relatively stable performance gap between E-CSI/&J and P-CSI/&J. The performance gap between them represents the gap between our proposed solution and the real solution. The P-CSI/&J scheme significantly outperforms the significantly outperformP-CSI/NJ scheme. From Fig. 4 (b) we can also see that, with the decrease of the eavesdropper uncertain region, the secrecy rate performances of both the P-CSI/&J scheme and P-CSI/NJ scheme increase, and the secrecy rate gap between the E-CSI/&J scheme and the P-CSI/&J scheme becomes smaller. It is because when the uncertainty of the eavesdropper reduces, the jammer ''knows'' more precise location information of the eavesdroppers. On the contrary, the E-CSI/&J scheme exhibits very similar performance under the two circumstances, as it knows the accurate locations of the Eves. Fig. 5 demonstrates the average secrecy rate performance versus different maximum power P max for different schemes. With the help of UAV friendly jammer, P-CSI/&J scheme significantly outperforms the P-CSI/NJ scheme. As we set a relatively small eavesdropper uncertain region, there exists a relative small performance gap between the E-CSI/&J scheme and the P-CSI/&J scheme, which has been demonstrated in Fig. 4 . The above results demonstrate that, with the help of UAV friendly jammer, our proposed P-CSI/&J scheme can bring great performance gain to the achievable WCSR in comparison with P-CSI/NJ scheme.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the PLS issue in UAV networks with multiple location-unknown eavesdroppers. Specifically, the flying trajectories and transmit power for both UAVs have been jointly optimized by maximizing the WCSR of the system. To solve the formulated non-convex optimization problem, a block coordinate descent based iterative optimization method has been proposed. Simulation results demonstrate that, with the help of jammer UAV, our proposed scheme exhibits more preferable flying trajectories for both UAVs, and can significantly improve the average WCSR of the system, in comparison with the strategy without a jammer UAV. 
